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COURT OF APPEALS, 1958 TERM
sis on that interest.8 6
The Second Department has allowed such a pleading on the grounds
that since the eventual recovery substantially accrues to the employee's
benefit, it should not appear that the insurer is endeavoring to collect and
retain for itself all the damages, and also, that the interest of the injured
party is no less real because someone else brings the actionsT
The Court of Appeals adopted the Second Department's position, recog-
nizing that a jury which is apprised of the employee's interest from the
beginning is more apt to return a verdict of similar magnitude as when the
employee himself brings the action.
The effect of this decision is that when and if an employee's rights are
litigated there is a better chance that he will be fully compensated even though
he has not brought the action himself. Since the Legislature has already
decreed that the recovery should largely inure in the employee's behalf, it seems
proper that the recovery should adequately reflect the damages sustained.
CONTRACTS
RECOVERY oF PROPERTY INVOLVED IN AN ILLEGAL TRANSACTION
There has been a long standing rule in New York that the courts will
not lend their weight to the enforcement of an illegal agreement.' One exception
to this rule is that a party who is a mere depository for funds or property
involved in the illegal transaction cannot avail himself of the rule so as to
avoid liability to the party for whom he is holding them.2 The basic rule is
premised on the policy against aiding the parties to an illegal transaction; as
for the exception, the policy against unjust enrichment apparently is given
greater weight and recovery is allowed.
Southwestern Shipping Corp. v. National City Bank3 posed a factual
situation in which the rule or the exception might have applied, depending
upon the manner in which the transaction involved was characterized. Italian
foreign exchange regulations require that an Italian importer must obtain a
permit license before he can pay for imports in United States currency.
One Garmoja desired to purchase chemicals through plaintiff, but did not
have the required permit license. In order to pay in dollars Garmoja made
an agreement with Corti, an Italian firm which had such a license, to the
86. Comm'r State Ins. Fund v. Clark Carting Co., 274 App. Div. 559, 86 N.Y.S.2d 313
(4th Dep't 1948).
87. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Stevedores, 278 App. Div. 661, 102 N.Y.S.2d
465 (2d Dep't 1951).
1. Gray v. Hook, 4 N.Y. 449 (1851); Stone v. Freeman, 298 N.Y. 268, 82 N.E.2d
571 (1948), and cases cited therein.
2. Stone v. Freeman, supra note 1; Murray v. Vanderbuilt 39 Barb. (N.Y.) 140
(1863); Woodworth v. Bennett, 43 N.Y. 273 (1870); Merritt v. Millard, 4 Keyes (N.Y.)
208 (1870).
3. 6 N.Y.2d 454, 190 N.Y.S.2d 352 (1959).
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effect that Garmoja would deposit a sum in Italian currency with Credito
Lombardo (an Italian bank) for Corti's account. An equivalent amount in
United States currency was then to be transferred to defendant American bank
for the credit of Anlyan, the American exporter to whom Corti's license ran.
Prior to this transfer Anlyan. assigned the credit to plaintiff. Defendant was
notified of the assignment and agreed that when the credit was received it
would be credited to plaintiff's account. The transfers by Garmoja and Credito
Lombardo were completed, but defendant bank paid the amount to Anlyan
who absconded. In this action by the American exporter against the American
bank, the jury found that the bank was negligent in paying the funds to Anlyan
and had breached its contract with plaintiff. The Trial Court,4 however, set
aside the verdict on the ground that the agreement was illegal by Italian law,
and it was, therefore, against the public policy of New York to enforce any
portion of the contract.5 This determination was affirmed by the Appellate
Division,0 and reversed by the Court of Appeals in a five-two decision
Those cases which apply the exception to the established rule do so where
the person holding the property was not a party to the illegal transaction and
is merely holding the property as an agent or trustee for a party to it.8 The
majority in the Court of Appeals held that the National City Bank was not
a party to the illegal transaction, but merely held the money as an agent for
the plaintiff shipping company. For this reason, the case fell within the
exception and the plaintiff was allowed to enforce his contract right. The
minority, on the other hand, characterized the entire undertaking as one illegal
transaction with which the defendant was indirectly involved, and for that
reason would have left the parties as it found them.
Both the majority and the minority assumed that the plaintiff was an
alter ego of Gamoja and, as such, a party to the illegal transaction. Neither,
however, suggested that the defendant was a real party, or even that it had
reason to suspect the purpose behind the assignment. Therefore, it would seem
that it should be characterized as a non-participating depository within the
terms of the exception as framed above.
There is, however, another aspect to the case. One phrasing of the rule
indicates that a party in a suit will not be allowed to rely upon an illegal
undertaking to prove any portion of a cause of action.0 This statement proceeds
4. 11 Misc. 2d 397, 173 N.Y.S.2d 509 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
5. Defendant claimed that Article VIII Section 2(b) of the Bretton Woods Inter-
national Monetary Agreement, [60 Stat. 1411, 22 U.S.C. § 286(h) (1945)] made the
plaintiff's action unenforceable in New York state. The majority of the Court, however,
indicated that this treaty in no way effected the common-law exception to the rule against
enforcement of illegal agreements.
6. 6 A.D.2d 1036, 178 N.Y.S.2d 1019 (1st Dep't 1958).
7. Supra note 3.
8. Dewitt v. Brisbane, 16 N.Y. 508 (1858) ; Stone v. Freeman, supra note 1.
9. "Whether a demand connected with an illegal transaction is capable of being
enforced at law depends on whether the party requires any aid from the illegal transaction
to establish his case." Woodworth v. Bennett, supra note 2 at 276.
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on the ground that the rule is intended as a disability to the plaintiff, and not
a protection to the defendant.10 If the instant case is viewed in this manner, the
outcome hinges on whether the whole plan or merely the Gamoja-Corti transfer
is characterized as the illegal transaction. The plaintiff must rely on the
assignment or it has no claim at all. This assignment would seem to be an
essential part of the illegal transaction and, if the second statement of the
rule is applied, the result reached by the minority would seem correct.
EFFECT OF SPECIFIC DISCLAIMER ON INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE OF FRAUD
In Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris" the Court repeated its adherence to
the basic tenet that "..... a general merger clause is ineffective to exclude parol
evidence to show fraud in inducing the contract... ,"1 but the plaintiff buyer
in this instance had, as did the plaintiff in Cohen v. Cohen,'3 specifically dis-
claimed reliance on representations not embodied in the contract.
The trial courts' order, reversed by the Appellate Division in a memo-
randum opinion which refused to extend the holding in Cohen,'4 was reinstated
by the Court of Appeals' decision that it would be impossible for the plaintiff to
prove reliance since the specific disclaimer of reliance on enumerated representa-
tions destroyed the allegation in the complaint that he had in fact relied.
This was especially so since the plaintiff had means available to him ". .. of
knowing, by the exercise of ordinary intelligence, the truth, or the real quality
of the subject of the representation....". 5
In Cohen, as in the instant case, the dissenting opinion urged that since
fraud vitiates every contract, and since the law recognizes the ineffectiveness
of a general merger clause to preclude proof of fraud, there should be no
distinction made between a general and specific disclaimer since the former
includes the latter, and fraud is fraud.' 6
Contrary to the dissent, 17 the majority holding properly considered a
conflicting principle that required maintaining a contract's effectiveness as
an instrument of agreement.' 8 As the court indicated in Ernst Iron Works v.
10. Carr v. Hoy, 2 N.Y.2d 185, 158 N.Y.S.2d 572 (1957).
11. 5 N.Y.2d 317, 184 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1959).
12. Bridger v. Goldsmith, 143 N.Y. 424, 38 N.E. 458 (1894); Jackson v. State of
New York, 210 App. Div. 115, 205 N.Y.S. 658, aff'd 241 N.Y. 563, 150 N.E. 556 (1925);
A general merger clause is a general provision in the contract to the effect that the entire
understanding of the parties is included in the agreement. See: The Merger Clause and Its
Application to Fraud, 6 BROoLYN LAW REviEw 446 (1937), 3 Williston, Contracts §§ 811,
811A (Rev. Ed., 1936).
13. 1 A.D.2d 586, 151 N.Y.S.2d 949, aff'd 3 N.Y.2d 813, 166 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1957).
In this case, a contract designed to settle pending marital litigation, provided that the
husband had made no representations concerning reconciliation, and the wife's later attempt
to bring suit alleging misrepresentation of the husband's intent on reconciliation was
rejected by the court.
14. Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, 6 A.D.2d 674, 174 N.Y.S.2d 219 (1st Dep't 1958).
15. Supra note 11 at 322, 184 N.Y.S.2d 599, 603 (1959).
16. Supra note 11 at 325, 184 N.Y.S.2d 599, 607 (1959).
17. Justice Fuld dissenting.
18. Supra note 11 at 323, 184 N.Y.S.2d 599, 604 (1959).
